I. INTRODUCTION
T he impact of taxes on labor supply is a perennial topic of interest in public and labor economics. While there has been longstanding interest in the labor supply of prime-age men and women, as well as the impact of specifc policies such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), there has been substantially less emphasis on the impact of taxes on older individuals. One challenge in this area is that there are few federal and state tax policies that differentially affect older people.
In this paper, we review evidence amassed over the last decade on the labor supply response to the Social Security earnings test, a policy that affects only older individuals. The test determines how labor supply affects the time path of payments to Social Security benefciaries, and is widely regarded as a pure tax on earnings. Prior to 2000, the test clawed back benefts at a rate of either 33 percent or 50 percent, depending on age, for earnings above a threshold amount. On top of federal and state payroll and income taxes, the earnings test can result in very high marginal tax rates on earnings and generate substantial labor supply disincentives at older ages.
In particular, we review the recent evidence on labor supply responses for older Americans based on the Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000. The 2000 Act eliminated the earnings test for those between the Social Security Full Retirement Age (FRA -roughly age 65) and age 70, but left intact the test for younger benefciaries (age 62 to the FRA). Individuals age 70 and older already were exempt from the test. This generated groups of older individuals who were differentially affected by the law change based on age. The subsequent research, conducted in the last ten years, including very recent unpublished work, has treated this law change as a natural experiment affecting the work incentives of older individuals. We focus on the 2000 Act, because it provides the sharpest and most timely policy change affecting older workers. Consequently, we do not review the large, earlier literature on the earnings test. Furthermore, if a recent study examines both the 2000 Act and older changes to the test, as many do, we only discuss the fndings on the 2000 Act.
We begin by describing the rules governing the earnings test and how they changed with the 2000 Act. Then we discuss the standard model of labor supply that most researchers have used as an organizing framework for their empirical analyses. Next, we summarize estimates of the uncompensated labor supply responses to the Act. Across a number of studies using different data sources, the estimated impacts on labor supply have been remarkably similar. For men age 65 to 69, the repeal of the test was associated with an increase in earnings of 8 percent to 20 percent and hours of 5 to 16 percent. For women age 65 to 69 claiming Social Security benefts on their own earnings history, the repeal was associated with an increase in earnings of 20 percent. For women of similar ages claiming benefts on their husband's earnings history, there was no impact on earnings. There is less consensus on the estimates for labor force participation, but these are generally closely clustered (negatively and positively) around zero, suggesting little response on the extensive margin.
An important recent innovation in the literature is the use of bunching at budget set kink points to estimate the compensated elasticity of earnings to the net-of-tax share on the intensive margin. Many studies document substantial bunching at the threshold amount of the earnings test, which subsequently disappeared due to the 2000 Act for workers age 65 to 69. We review the estimates of the compensated elasticity identifed from the policy variation in the 2000 Act, which are small, in the 0.05 to 0.12 range. Under the view that the test is a pure tax on earnings, these estimates suggest that, conditional on being in the labor force, labor supply is very inelastic for older workers, even after accounting for adjustment costs. We conclude with a discussion of lessons from this research.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE 2000 ACT
The basis for Social Security benefts is Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), the program's measure of career earnings. AIME is based on the 35 highest years of real earnings. The basic monthly beneft for someone who claims at the FRA is the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), which is a piecewise-linear function of the AIME. Table 1 shows the FRA for birth cohorts typically used in the studies reviewed below. Traditionally, the FRA was age 65, so that the month in which an individual attained the FRA always occurred in the calendar year in which the individual turned age 65. However, as a result of the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act, the FRA was increased by two months for each year of birth from [1938] [1939] [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] . For those born in these years, this means that the month in which the individual attains the FRA may fall either in the calendar year in which the individual turns 65 or in the calendar year in which the individual turns 66, depending on the month of birth.
To arrive at the actual monthly beneft m, the PIA is actuarially adjusted for the claiming age (the youngest claiming age is 62). For those claiming at older ages, the PIA In the latter case, the individual receives half of the spouse's actual monthly beneft. The extent to which benefts are clawed back under the earnings test depends on age relative to the FRA and type of benefciary. Table 2 shows the parameters before and after 2000 for a primary benefciary. For example, in panel A, the claw-back rate q , also known as the beneft reduction rate, is 50 percent for annual earnings above the threshold amount z* for individuals younger than the FRA (for the entire year). In panels B after 1999 and C before 2000, the claw-back rate is 33 percent for those who either reach or had attained the FRA (during the calendar year). The threshold amounts differ within panels across time, and across the panels, and thus vary by both age and time. The key is panel C, which shows that the 2000 Act repealed the earnings test for those between the FRA and age 70. In addition, there was no earnings test for those who were age 70 and older. These are the sources of identifying variation (age-by-time) that are used in the empirical studies reviewed below.
Two additional features of the system are noteworthy. First, the earnings test only applies to the earnings of the primary benefciary; a spousal benefciary is not subject to the test. Second, annual earnings subject to the test may be high enough to replace a low-earnings year in the determination of the 35 highest earning years for the AIME. In this case, benefts will be computed to a higher level, and work under the test may increase benefts through this beneft re-computation effect. This effect is not explicitly modeled in the studies reviewed below. Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif (2009) provide a discussion and estimates of the impact of this Social Security provision on the labor supply of older individuals.
III. THE EARNINGS TEST AS A LABOR INCOME TAX
In most studies, the earnings test is analyzed for an individual Social Security benefciary. The typical framework is a standard static unitary labor supply model, with a linear budget set, and no saving. Let c denote after-tax income and z denote pre-tax earnings. Then, following Saez (2010) and Gelber, Jones, and Sacks (2013) , the individual maximizes utility,
(1) u(c, z; n), subject to the budget constraint,
Utility depends positively on after-tax income (i.e., consumption, since there is no saving), and negatively on pre-tax earnings, since there is disutility from labor supply. Pre-tax earnings follow a smooth density function, h(z), where differences in earnings are due to differences in ability, skill, or preferences. These are refected in the utility index n. The term y refers to virtual income. The focal part of the budget constraint is t, the marginal tax rate on labor income, where 1 -t is the net-of-tax share. Figure 1 illustrates the budget set for a benefciary who has attained the FRA. The horizontal axis measures pre-tax earnings and the vertical axis measures after-tax income. Under the earnings test, the slope of the budget line below the earnings test threshold z* is 1 -t. From z* to z′, the slope is 1 -t -dt, where dt is the effective claw-back rate from the earnings test. The earnings level z′ is the phase-out point at which all annual benefts have been clawed back, z′ = 12m/dt, where m is the monthly beneft. For earnings beyond this point, the slope of the budget line is 1 -t. The test induces a convex kink in the budget set at z* and a non-convex kink at z′. The convex kink will produce bunching of individuals who, in the absence of the test, would have had earnings in the interval from z* to z* + dz*. When the earnings test is abolished, any such bunching should disappear.
Furthermore, upon repeal the budget line has a slope of 1 -t for all earnings levels. This results in intensive-margin effects that may operate on larger segments of the budget line than the local effect from bunching. First, those who had earnings above the phase-out point z′ experience a pure income effect, which reduces earnings and labor supply. Second, those who had earnings in the interval from z* to z′, experience both substitution and income effects, which go in opposite directions and have a theoretically ambiguous impact on earnings and labor supply. Finally, for those with positive earnings below the threshold z*, the budget set is unchanged, and there is no change in earnings and labor supply.
A key point of debate in the literature concerns how to conceptualize the effective claw-back rate dt. The arguably dominant view is that the test represents a pure tax on earnings. In this case, earnings above the threshold z*, are taxed at the rate q, which is 
the beneft reduction rate. Hence, dt = q. From Table 2 , q = 0.50 or q = 0.33, depending on calendar year and age. At these rates, the test imposes high marginal tax rates on earnings above z*, and could provide substantial labor supply disincentives. An alternative view is that the test is not a pure tax because lost benefts from the test may be returned to the benefciary in later years in a manner designed to be actuarially fair. For those who have attained the FRA, the rate of adjustment is the same as the delayed retirement credit. This feature of the test could attenuate or eliminate any labor supply disincentives.
This view complicates the analysis of the earnings test for a number of reasons. First, many studies have pointed out that there might be heterogeneity in discount rates that makes the future return of lost benefts relatively more favorable for some individuals rather than others. For example, the rate at which benefts are returned is better than actuarially fair for those with lower than population-average mortality risk. Discount-rate heterogeneity could stem from such differences in mortality risk, as well as liquidity constraints and differences in the pure rate of time preference (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2008; Engelhardt and Kumar, 2009) . Second, it is unclear the extent to which older Americans understand, in principle, that lost benefts may be returned in the future. For example, Gruber and Orszag (2003) and Figinski (2012) have argued that tax-preparation guides for the public view the test as a pure tax. In addition, Liebman and Luttmer (2011) found that while 62 percent of respondents in their survey of Social Security knowledge were generally aware of the earnings test, just 39 percent knew that lost benefts are fully returned to benefciaries with an actuarial adjustment. The earnings test as a pure tax becomes a better frst-order approximation, the less aware the public is of this feature.
The claw-back rate can be expressed to refect these two views. In particular, let d be the adjustment rate (i.e., the rate at which lost benefts are returned in the future), where d ≥ 1. Let b be the individual's discount rate, where b ≥ 1. Finally, let a be the extent to which the individual perceives that lost benefts may be returned in the future, where 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. A value of a = 0 means the individual views the test as a pure tax, while a value of a = 1 means the individual fully understands that future benefts are increased as current benefts are clawed back. Then the effective claw-back rate from the earnings test is
There are four important cases to consider, listed below by the size of the change in the claw-back rate from the repeal of the earnings test:
a. For an individual unaware of the return of benefts, a = 0, so dt = q, and the test is a pure tax on earnings. When the test is repealed, this group experiences the largest decline in claw-back rates, from q to 0.
b. For an individual with a discount rate greater than the actuarial adjustment and fully aware that lost benefts are returned in the future, b > d and a = 1, so 0 < dt < q. When the test is repealed, this group experiences a decline in the clawback rate, but this change is smaller than for in case (a). c. For an individual with a discount rate equal to the actuarial adjustment and fully aware that lost benefts are returned in the future, b = d and a = 1, so dt = 0. When the test is repealed, this group experiences no change in the claw-back rate.
d. For an individual with a discount rate less than the actuarial adjustment and fully aware that lost benefts are returned in the future, b < d and a = 1, so dt < 0, and the effective claw-back rate is negative. When the test is repealed, the claw-back rate actually rises.
Therefore, the possibility of heterogeneous responses to the law change arises naturally under the alternative view that the test is not a pure tax on earnings.
At a more detailed level, the actual rules for future beneft receipt are much more complicated than typically described in the literature and almost surely are not well understood by the general public. Gelber, Jones, and Sacks (2013) provide a comprehensive discussion of this point. For example, in any given year in which the test applies, benefts are clawed back once earnings exceed the threshold amount z*. However, the actuarially fair return of lost benefts is triggered only after one month's worth of benefts have been lost. This implies the test imposes a tax on earnings of dt = q for earnings in the interval [z*, z* + m/q] and dt = q (1 -a(d/b)) for earnings above z* + m/q. For example, the threshold z* was $15,500 in 1999 for an individual who had attained the FRA (Table 2 , column 3). If the individual's monthly beneft was $1,500, then the claw-back rate would have been dt = q = 0.33 (Table 2 , column 4) for earnings in the interval from $15,500 to $20,000. The test thus appears as a pure tax locally in the neighborhood of the earnings threshold z*, but may not be a pure tax more globally.
1 While the standard model outlined above has been the main organizing framework for empirical studies on the earnings test, it has a number of important limitations. First, it assumes that individuals can smoothly alter their labor supply -there are no adjustment costs and no labor-market rigidities. The abolition of the earnings test could generate extensive-margin (participation) responses in the presence of fxed costs to working, constraints on minimum hours, or other labor-market rigidities that might affect older workers. Intensive-margin responses might also be muted by adjustment costs. Second, the standard model is static. There could be intertemporal responses if individuals shift labor supply across years in response to tax differentials. The treatment of the return of lost benefts summarized in (3) for the purposes of exposition conveniently collapses the program rules from two periods into one, but does not address potential intertemporal responses in a satisfactory manner. Finally, the standard model is unitary. It ignores differential treatment of primary versus spousal benefciaries in married couples, as well as potential complementarity (substitutability) in labor supply that arises in a variety of models of joint labor supply.
IV. REDUCED-FORM ESTIMATES BASED ON THE 2000 ACT
We review and summarize the main empirical fndings from seven of the most prominent studies on the 2000 Act. Each study measures uncompensated labor supply responses and exploits the same underlying variation in a natural experiment framework: the Act repealed the earnings test for those from the FRA to age 70, but did not change labor supply incentives (in the same manner) for those under the FRA or those age 70 and older. These latter two groups represent control groups that sandwich the treatment group.
A. Intratemporal Findings for Men
In one of the most important papers on the 2000 Act, Haider and Loughran (2008) examined the labor supply of men between ages 60 and 76. They used variation in exposure to the earnings test based on the year of birth, drawing on data from two sources: In Engelhardt and Kumar (2009) , we examined the impact on labor supply of men between ages 62 and 72, based on panel data from the 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). We used variation in exposure to the earnings test based both on the year and month of birth. Our central estimates were that the 2000 Act led to an increase of 8 to 16 percent in annual hours for those between the FRA and age 70, with most of this response in the form of increased full-time work.
We also examined the labor supply response for three sub-groups of men: minorities, smokers, and the lesser educated. To the extent these groups have higher than average mortality risk, high rates of pure time preference, or liquidity constraints, they may have found the actuarial adjustment built into the earnings test relatively disadvantageous and work especially attractive after the repeal (i.e., been more likely to have b > d ). We found evidence broadly consistent with this prediction: the hours, full-time work, and labor-force participation responses we identifed for all older men were concentrated mostly in these groups. To the extent that men in these sub-groups are less aware of the rules governing the return of benefts -something we did not explore -these fndings also might refect heterogeneous responses to the repeal based on awareness (i.e., a).
B. Intratemporal Findings for Women
There has been surprisingly little work done on the female labor supply response to repeal of the earnings test. Women are interesting, because traditionally they have been more likely than men to be spousal benefciaries. Since the test only applies to primary benefciaries, women who were spousal benefciaries should have been less affected by the 2000 Act than women who were primary benefciaries. Figinski (2012) used variation in exposure to the earnings test based on the year of birth. Using data from the 2004 BEPUF, he found that the 2000 Act led to an increase in earnings of 19 percent for women ages 66 to 69 who were primary benefciaries. In addition, labor force participation rose for this group by 2 percentage points. In contrast, he found no such impacts for women of the same age who were spousal benefciaries. Figinski's results for men were very similar to those found by others, as he estimated that the 2000 Act raised the earnings and labor force participation of men between the FRA and age 70 by 20 percent and 1.3 percentage points, respectively.
C. Pooled Results
The discussion of Figure 1 above indicated that individuals with different levels of earnings should have been affected differently by the repeal of the earnings test, with low earners being unaffected, earners near the kink experiencing both substitution and income effects, and earners above the phase-out experiencing an income effect. In one of the most interesting papers on the 2000 Act, Song and Manchester (2007) exploited this variation and estimated the impact of the repeal of the earnings test across the earnings distribution. They used data from the SSA Continuous Work History Supplement (CWHS) from 1996-2003. Using variation in exposure to the earnings test based on the year of birth, they examined the labor supply of a large pooled sample of men and women and found that the 2000 Act led to an increase in earnings of those ages 66 to 69 concentrated in the 60 th to 80 th percentiles of the earnings distributions. These effects were in the 6 to 10 percent range. They also found some evidence for negative income effects at the top of the earnings distribution. They did not fnd clear evidence on the effect of the repeal of the earnings test on labor force participation.
D. Intertemporal Responses
In an intertemporal context, eliminating the earnings test for those between the FRA and age 70 tilts the net wage profle for an individual, yielding relatively higher wages at older ages. This could generate intertemporal substitution of labor supply from younger to older ages. Three studies have examined aspects of this in the context of the 2000 Act. Tran (2004) used the 1996-2002 CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups for white men between ages 55 and 75. Similar to the studies focused on intratemporal responses, he found that the 2000 Act increased labor supply of men between the FRA and age 70. However, he also found that younger men worked less. Friedberg and Webb (2009) used data from the CPS and HRS for ages 55 to 74. They found that both past and anticipated future earnings test rules affected current labor supply. Finally, Michaud and van Soest (2008) used data from the HRS and found evidence that workers under age 62 changed their expectations of future work after the 2000 Act, in particular, the likelihood of working past the FRA.
In combination, these studies suggest a role for intertemporal responses. The more responsive younger workers are in their current labor supply decisions to future parameters of the earnings test, the less well suited younger workers are as a control group for those above the FRA in estimating the impact of the 2000 Act. Indeed, to the extent those below the FRA reduced their labor supply, the evidence from the intratemporal studies discussed above might be viewed as upper bounds on the true uncompensated labor supply responses.
V. MEASUREMENT MATTERS
The convex kink in Figure 1 will produce bunching of individuals who, in the absence of the test, would have had earnings just above the threshold. When the earnings test was abolished, any such bunching should have disappeared. Haider and Loughran (2008) made a persuasive case that if there is substantial measurement error in earnings (as suggested by Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) and Bricker and Engelhardt (2008) ), the use of self-reported earnings understates the extent of bunching. This in turn implies that the labor supply response to the repeal of the test is understated. In particular, they examined bunching based on both self-reported earnings in the CPS and in administrative data in the BEPUF. They found the rate of bunching to be 60 to 120 percent higher at the threshold amount using the administrative data. Song and Manchester (2007) , Figinski (2012) , and Gelber, Jones, and Sacks (2013) also documented signifcant changes in bunching from the 2000 Act in administrative data. These changes are much larger and more precisely estimated than those based on self-reported earnings data in the CPS (Haider and Loughran, 2008) and HRS (Engelhardt and Kumar, 2009) .
VI. ELASTICITY ESTIMATES BASED ON BUNCHING
The studies above all estimated uncompensated labor supply responses to the 2000 Act. As reduced-form estimates, they do not require the researcher to take a position on the effective claw-back rate dt. However, the standard measure needed to determine the deadweight loss from labor income taxation is based on the compensated response. Numerous recent studies have used the extent of bunching to calculate a compensated elasticity of earnings with respect to the net-of-tax share.
Specifcally, the convex kink at the threshold z* in Figure 1 will produce bunching of individuals who, in the absence of the test, would have had earnings in the interval from z* to z* + dz*. Let this interval be a small neighborhood just above z*. For a small change in the tax rate dt in this neighborhood, income effects can be considered to be of second-order importance. Saez (2010) showed that the compensated elasticity of earnings with respect to the net-of-tax share, e, can be expressed as
When the earnings test is considered a pure tax, dt is not small, as it is either 0.33 or 0.50 depending on age. Saez also derived a closed-form solution for the compensated elasticity when the change in the marginal tax rate at the kink is not small. In particular, the elasticity is a function of four empirically estimable pieces: the threshold amount z*, the amount of bunching B at the kink, the quotient of the net-of-tax shares on the right and left sides of the kink, and the density of earnings on the right (h(z*) + ) and left (h(z*) -) sides of the kink, respectively. He then showed, in the context of the EITC, how the compensated elasticity could be estimated using administrative tax data. Song and Manchester (2007) applied Saez's framework to the earnings test using Social Security administrative earnings data. They assumed that the test represented a pure tax on earnings. Their estimated compensated elasticity based on the repeal of the earnings test ranged from 0.05-0.07 for men and women (pooled) between ages 65 and 69.
Chetty (2012) and Chetty et al. (2011) showed that the extent of bunching and the implied compensated elasticity could suffer from serious attenuation if workers faced adjustment costs or hours restrictions that impeded their ability to bunch at kink points. This is important in the context of the earnings test, as Haider and Loughran (2008) found evidence of considerable labor market rigidities that led to attenuation in bunching. In addition, Friedberg and Webb (2009) estimated persistence in labor supply choices after the 2000 Act. This suggests that older individuals might face costs of adjusting their labor supply in response to changes in the earnings test.
In an innovative paper, Gelber, Jones, and Sacks (2013) have extended the Saez method to incorporate adjustment costs in the analysis of the earnings test. In particular, they used administrative data on earnings from the Social Security Administration Master Earnings File for male and female benefciaries in the Master Benefciary Record data to jointly estimate the compensated elasticity and adjustment costs, under the assumption that the test represented a pure tax on earnings. Without adjustment costs, they estimated a compensated elasticity of 0.09-0.12 for ages 66 to 69 (men and women pooled) based on the 2000 Act. These estimates are very similar to those of Song and Manchester (2007) . With adjustment costs, their estimates of the compensated elasticity were very similar. In fact, the estimated money metric value of the adjustment costs was very small for the 2000 Act, between $15 and $56.
VII. CONCLUSION
We draw a number of lessons about the responsiveness of the labor supply of older Americans. First, on the intensive margin, the compensated elasticities identifed from the policy variation in the 2000 Act are in the 0.05 to 0.12 range. Under the view that the test is a pure tax on earnings, these are small responses and indicate that labor supply is inelastic. Under the alternative view that the effective marginal tax rates are less than the statutory claw-back rates because of the future return of lost benefts, this range of estimates would represent lower bounds on the true compensated elasticity. Second, the Act itself generated increases in labor supply, primarily on the intensive margin. Across a number of studies, the estimates for men suggest a 5 to 16 percent increase in hours and 8 to 20 percent increase in earnings. Third, when studying earnings, administrative data are a must. Measurement error in self-reported earnings appears to signifcantly attenuate observed labor supply responses for older workers.
There are still a number of gaps in the literature. In order to identify compensated and uncompensated labor supply elasticities from law changes such as the 2000 Act, the researcher must make an assumption regarding the extent to which the earnings test is a pure tax. Under the pure-tax view, the change in the effective claw-back rate from the repeal of the earnings test is large and, for any given change in earnings or hours, the resulting elasticities are small. Under the alternative view that the change in the effective claw-back rate is smaller, the elasticities would be larger for the same change in earnings or hours -although the magnitudes of these two effects are uncertain. Thus it would seem that a task of first-order importance would be to obtain more evidence on the extent to which the test is viewed as a pure tax, by sub-groups in order to identify heterogeneity in responses. The experimental approach taken in recent studies by Liebman and Luttmer (2011) and Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2011) seems promising in this regard. Beyond the measurement of marginal tax rates, there is little consensus on the extensive margin (participation) response for both men and women. More broadly, more evidence is needed for women. In particular, the response of women is more complicated, because of the differential impact of the earnings test by benefciary type (primary or spousal). This warrants more examination, as do models of joint labor supply. More generally, Blau and Kahn (2007) found evidence that uncompensated labor supply elasticities for prime-age married women have been falling over time and cross-spouse elasticities have been diminishing as well -essentially women are becoming more like men in their labor supply decisions. This means we need to rely more on new evidence and less on existing fndings for women. Additional work is needed on intertemporal responses, either from reduced-form approaches such as those reviewed above, or from structural approaches such as that utilized by Gustman and Steinmeier (2008) , especially when the goal is projecting the impact of potential changes to the earnings test below the FRA.
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